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Consumption of biofuels is scheduled to ramp up to 36 billion gallons over the next 
13 years if the timetable set in the 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is 
to be maintained. To ensure that fuel 
blenders meet this volume, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
uses the market for biofuel RINs 
(Renewable Identifi cation Numbers) 
to create a suffi cient incentive. 
Gasoline producers and import-
ers are assigned a number of RINs 
that they must give to EPA each 
year. Because each gallon of bio-
fuels has a RIN associated with it, 
producers and importers can obtain 
RINs by buying biofuels and keep-
ing the RINs. Alternatively, they can 
enter the RIN market and buy the 
RINs from somebody else. Sellers of 
RINs are companies who purchase 
biofuels but who have no obligation 
to meet an EPA requirement or who 
purchase more biofuels than they 
need to fulfi ll their EPA requirement. 
The market for RINs works because 
the demand for RINs increases when 
the quantity of biofuels purchased 
is insuffi cient to meet the RFS. An 
increased demand for RINs increas-
es the RIN price, which improves 
the relative attractiveness of buying 
biofuels instead of RINs. An example 
shows why.
Suppose that the wholesale 
price of ethanol is $2.00 per gallon 
but the wholesale price of gasoline 
is only $1.50. With these prices, 
the demand for ethanol would be 
quite low. However if with every 
$2.00 gallon of ethanol a buyer 
obtains a RIN with a value of $0.25 
per gallon, then ethanol is more 
attractive because the net cost of 
ethanol would be $1.75 per gallon. 
If the RIN price is $0.75 per gallon, 
then the demand for $2.00 ethanol 
would be quite high because the 
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net cost of using ethanol to meet 
fuel demand would be only $1.25 
per gallon. The RIN price will even-
tually settle at a level at which the 
demand for ethanol is just great 
enough to meet the RFS. 
Meeting the RFS is more compli-
cated than simply meeting a single 
RIN target, however. Individual 
mandates for conventional biofuels, 
cellulosic biofuels, other advanced 
biofuels, and biodiesel must all be 
met. Although the EPA has not is-
sued fi nal rules about how the RFS 
will be met, it seems plausible that 
there will be at least four separate 
RIN markets at work, one for each 
type of biofuel. 
Determining the Price of RINs
The price of a RIN refl ects the dif-
ference in the market value of a bio-
fuel in meeting fuel demand and the 
price that is needed to allow biofuel 
producers to cover the costs of 
producing the required amount of 
biofuel. This means that RIN prices 
will refl ect changes in both mar-
ket values and production costs. 
Because biofuels substitute for 
petroleum-based fuels, the price of 
crude oil will be one factor that de-
termines RIN prices. Higher crude 
oil prices will lead to lower RIN 
prices. Feedstock costs should re-
main the largest and most variable 
determinant of production costs. 
Thus, high crude oil prices and low 
feedstock prices would seem to cre-
ate a favorable climate for biofuels, 
which would be refl ected in low RIN 
prices. But a key factor in the deter-
mination of future RIN prices is how 
the U.S. market will value biofuels 
once U.S. consumption advances 
beyond about 12 billion gallons, 
which will happen in the next year 
or two. This valuation will depend 
on whether the advanced and cel-
lulosic biofuels mandates are met 
with ethanol or with some other 
biofuel such as biocrude. 
How to Use 35 Billion Gallons 
of Ethanol
Suppose non-diesel automotive fuel 
use in 2022 rises from its current 
level of 135 billion gallons to 150 
billion gallons, of which 35 billion 
gallons comes from ethanol. If some 
small portion of the U.S. gasoline 
supply remains as unblended fuel 
(say 10 percent), then the fuel sup-
ply will consist of 106 billion gallons 
of E10, 15 billion gallons of gasoline, 
and 29 billion gallons of E85. This 
scenario assumes that there are suf-
fi cient fl ex-fuel vehicles in the fl eet to 
use this amount of E85. The prices 
of these fuels must be such that a 
suffi cient number of fl ex-fuel vehicles 
use E85 instead of E10. Because E85 
has about 75 percent of the energy 
value of E10, E85 must have a retail 
price that is at least 25 percent less 
than E10. For comparison, Brazilian 
consumers pay 40% less for 100% 
ethanol relative to E25, a discount 
that is greater than the energy dif-
ference. The extra discount likely is 
needed to compensate drivers for the 
time required to make more frequent 
stops at the gas station. 
Consumers choose fuel based 
on retail prices. Blenders use 
wholesale prices to determine 
. . . a key factor in the 
determination of future RIN 
prices is how the U.S. 
market will value biofuels 
once U.S. consumption 
advances beyond about 
12 billion gallons, which 
will happen in the next 
year or two. 
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Table 1. Wholesale price of 100 percent ethanol needed to induce use 
of E85
Table 2. Wholesale price of ethanol needed to induce use of E15
what fuel blends to use. Retail fuel 
prices equal the wholesale price 
plus taxes plus transportation 
costs plus a profi t margin. Of key 
importance here is the share of the 
spread between retail and whole-
sale prices that are accounted for 
by cents-per-gallon taxes, rather 
than percentage taxes. The federal 
gas tax and most state taxes are 
cents-per-gallon taxes. A reason-
able approximation for the spread 
between wholesale and retail fuel 
prices is that the retail price equals 
the wholesale price plus 10 percent 
plus 40¢. This formula allows for 
calculation of the wholesale price 
of ethanol that would be required 
to make E85 competitive with E10 
at the retail level. Table 1 provides 
the results for crude oil prices 
ranging from $30 to $90 per barrel. 
The prices associated with the 25 
percent discount will occur if con-
sumers choose E85 at a retail price 
that refl ects only the lower fuel 
economy of E85. Even with this op-
timistic assumption, the wholesale 
price of ethanol relative to gaso-
line will be discounted by more 
than its energy content because 
of the cents-per-gallon gas taxes. 
A larger retail discount implies an 
even larger ethanol discount at the 
wholesale level.
These prices hold even if U.S. 
policy is changed to allow E20 
blends. If 10 percent of fuel will be 
pure petroleum gasoline and the 
rest an E20 blend, then a maxi-
mum of 27 billion gallons of etha-
nol could be used in an E20 blend. 
This implies that the remainder 
will need to be sold as E85, and 
the prices in Table 1 remain good 
estimates of the wholesale etha-
nol prices that would be needed to 
induce consumption of 35 billion 
gallons of ethanol.
Inexpensive crude oil in 2022 
implies a wholesale ethanol price 
of between 39¢ and 56¢ per gallon 
(depending on the E85 discount 
needed at retail level) in order to 
make E85 competitive with blended 
fuel. Even if oil rises to $90 per bar-
rel (which implies a retail gaso-
line price of $3.15 per gallon), the 
required wholesale ethanol price 
would fall to between $1.22 and 
$1.57 per gallon. 
These prices are well below the 
levels needed to induce investors to 
spend the billions of dollars need-
ed to meet the cellulosic biofuels 
mandate. These prices are not even 
high enough to induce investors 
to expand corn ethanol capacity 
to the RFS target of 15 billion gal-
lons. However, the price outlook 
for ethanol would be brighter if the 
advanced and cellulosic biofuels 
mandates could be met by biofuels 
other than ethanol.
Alternatives to Ethanol
The economic drawback to us-
ing 35 billion gallons of ethanol 
to meet the RFS is that its lower 
energy content, combined with the 
way that we tax automotive fuels, 
means that the price of ethanol will 
need to be heavily discounted rela-
tive to gasoline to get consumers 
to choose E85. The situation may 
change, however, if 15 billion gal-
lons of ethanol are used to meet the 
conventional biofuels mandate, the 
EPA allows blend levels to rise to 
15 percent (E15), and the advanced 
biofuels mandate is met by biofuels 
other than ethanol. 
If we allocate the 150 billion 
gallons of fuel use to 15 billion gal-
lons of corn ethanol and 20 billion 
gallons of other biofuels, then we 
have 100 billion gallons of E15 and 
20 billion gallons of other biofuels, 
which may be part of the E15 blend 
or blended with the remaining 30 
billion gallons of gasoline. Given the 
lower energy content of ethanol, 
fuel economy from E15 relative to 
gasoline would drop by about 4.8 
percent, or 1.45 miles per gallon on 
a 30-mile-per gallon car. Most likely, 
not many drivers would even notice 
a drop of this magnitude. Table 2 
shows the wholesale ethanol prices 
that would be needed to induce 
drivers to fi ll up with E15 instead 
of petroleum gasoline under three 
different discounts. A zero discount 
implies that drivers would be indif-
ferent between E15 and E0, perhaps 
because of higher octane possibili-
ties with E15. The 2.5 percent dis-
count compensates for a small drop 
in fuel mileage. The 4.8 percent dis-
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count assumes that drivers suffer a 
4.8 percent drop in miles per gallon 
and that they recognize the drop. 
A comparison of the estimates in 
Table 2 of required ethanol prices 
with the estimates in Table 1 shows 
that the worst-case scenario for 
E15 is equal to the best-case sce-
nario for E85: namely, that ethanol 
is priced at its energy value at the 
retail level. For all other scenarios, 
limiting ethanol to 15 billion gal-
lons and moving to other biofuels 
substantially increases the market 
valuation of ethanol. 
RINs versus Direct Subsidies 
Advocates of biofuels should pay 
more attention to the problem of 
closing future gaps between the 
market value of biofuels and the 
price needed to justify the large 
investments that will be required to 
meet the RFS. As previously dis-
cussed, one method of closing the 
gap created by conventional biofuels 
is to move away from ethanol and 
instead meet the advanced biofuels 
mandates with other types of biofu-
els, such as biobutanol or biocrude. 
If the advanced biofuels have higher 
energy content than ethanol (such 
as biobutanol) or can more easily 
be used by the existing vehicle fl eet 
(such as products made from bio-
crude), then there is some hope that 
the market value of advanced biofu-
els could be equal to gasoline.
But a gap between the market 
value of biofuels and the needs of 
investors will likely continue to 
exist because of high feedstock 
prices or low crude oil prices. Cur-
rent methods that are used to close 
the gap include tax credits and the 
market for RINs. At present, the 
RIN price refl ects the difference 
between the ethanol price that is 
required to keep ethanol plants 
running and the market value of the 
ethanol plus the 45¢ tax credit for 
corn ethanol. 
If the RIN market is to be used 
to induce investment in expanded 
capacity, the RIN price would have 
to be high enough to cover both the 
variable costs of producing biofuels 
and the risk-adjusted costs of capi-
tal for new plants as well. The risk 
adjustment is necessary because 
investors know the EPA can waive 
the RFS if the RIN-infl ated cost of 
fuel becomes too high or if existing 
plant capacity or feedstock avail-
ability is inadequate to produce 
enough biofuels to meet the RFS. 
Furthermore, the market for RINs 
seems ill suited for inducing invest-
ment in plant capacity because of 
the time needed for a new plant 
to come online. Will investors risk 
their money today hoping that in 
two or three years the RFS for ad-
vanced biofuels will continue to be 
enforced and the market price of 
RINs will cover their capital costs 
as well as their production costs? 
The risk-adjusted return on capital 
would need to be very high indeed.
Higher tax credits to induce 
investment in expanded capacity 
would be more effective because 
tax credits are paid for by the U.S. 
Treasury rather than by fuel con-
sumers. Thus, they are less likely 
to trigger requests for waivers from 
the RFS. Congress recognized this 
and decided to keep the 45¢-per-
gallon tax credit for corn ethanol 
and to pass a new tax credit of $1.01 
per gallon for cellulosic biofuels. 
The promised ramp-up in the 
production of cellulosic biofuels will 
take more than legislation. It will 
require billions of dollars in private 
investment. It is doubtful that the 
required level of private investment 
will take place without signifi cant 
involvement of the federal govern-
ment. Funding for research, direct 
subsidies in the form of tax credits 
and loan guarantees, and guaran-
tees of adequate fuel prices at the 
plant through enforcement of the 
RFS will all be needed. Supporters of 
biofuels will have to make the case 
that biofuels can increase energy in-
dependence and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions at lower cost than 
other transportation technologies 
such as trains and plug-in hybrids. 
Only then can a strong case be 
made for an expanded federal role in 
the biofuels sector. ◆
